

**We Thought The State Dept. Considered The Principle of Non-Intervention Obsolete**

"The U.S. is taking a hard look at a Chilean proposal for the protection of human rights in the hemisphere because some officials believe it might lead to a situation

where the O.A.S. would be in a position to investigate racial problems in the U.S."

—Washington Star from the Rio Conference, Nov. 19

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15 CENTS

## **Delusions That Failed in Korea Won't Work in Vietnam**

The most important battle of the war has begun. It is the battle to convince the American people that they can win the Vietnamese war quickly if only the Air Force is given carte blanche to "clobber" the North. The Nixon interview on *Face The Nation* last Sunday (Nov. 21) and General Curtis Le May's interview with the Associated Press the same day (the fullest version may be found in the *Baltimore Sun*, Nov. 22) seek to exploit both the widespread anxiety about greater involvement and the widespread delusion of victory by air-power. How powerful an election issue this can become may be seen from Stewart Alsop's sensitive and revealing opinion survey in the *Saturday Evening Post* (Oct. 23) which found almost three out of five persons polled thought "we should go even further in Vietnam, even if it means bombing Hanoi and Red China."

### **Bombing Has Already Failed**

The bombings of the North which began last February were sold first as a means of forcing North Vietnam to throw in the sponge at the negotiating table and then as a means of shutting off the supply of men and aid to the South. It has failed in both respects. Gen. Thomas S. Power, the retired Commander in Chief of the Strategic Air Command, in his book last year "Design for Survival" said that by aerial ultimatum and selected bombing of military depots we could force the North to surrender "within a few days and with minimum force" (pps. 224-225). Now, ten months after the Powers' formula was adopted, the North has shown itself less disposed than ever to end the war. When it became clear months ago that blackmail by bombing would not work, the bombing was defended as a means of destroying sources of supply and interdicting supply lines. But the only result is that the North is now infiltrating whole regiments into the South where before there was only a trickle of men and supplies. The fighting has shifted, as the pro-war and pro-bombing *U.S. News & World Report* admits (Nov. 29), "from hide-and-seek jungle warfare to savage, open battles involving well-trained North Vietnamese and Americans." The tempo of the war has risen despite intense bombing of both North and South.

The pressure on Johnson to expand the Vietnamese war recalls the pressure on Truman to expand the Korean war. Le May is out to play the role of MacArthur. The advice Le May gives now is the advice Le May gave then. "I happen to believe," he told the Associated Press pompously in his latest interview, "we can get the message across better by the

### **Henry A. Wallace**

Henry Wallace was an exasperating cross between a saint and a village innocent. He never gave to his work as political leader or editor the kind of hard grappling with fact that he applied to corn breeding. In the 1948 campaign, he often read second-rate scripts prepared by third-rate Communist party liners. He could be a most woolly-minded man, and some of his offhand remarks (like that on the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia) could make the hair even of devoted followers stand on end. But of all the political leaders of the New Deal generation none has proved a truer visionary. All the major ideas he espoused, and for which he was savagely ridiculed, have since become accepted parts of governmental thinking and policy: the ideas of the "ever-normal granary", of food for peace (derided as a proposal to give a quart of milk to every Hottentot), and of full employment were Wallace's. So was the idea that the postwar world, in the decline of imperialism, would be "the century of the common man." The most hostile storm of all was stirred by his anti-cold war campaign for the Presidency in 1948. But two decades, and many billions of armament dollars later, we and the Russians have come around to accepting the idea he espoused of peaceful co-existence, as some day we will with the Chinese. He applied to world politics the best strain of his native evangelical Middle Western idealism. We followed him with love in what we knew would be a lost battle in 1948. But what he stood for no longer looks lost today.

use of airpower than by the use of ground forces." The "message," of course, is that the North Vietnamese had better surrender or we will burn up their country. In his newly published autobiography, "Mission With LeMay," he relates that when the Korean war broke out "my immediate suggestion" was "that we go up North and burn the principal cities, as we had done in World War II in Japan. I believed that this would stop the war very quickly, with minimal casualties." (p. 458). This is also his recipe for winning in Vietnam.

Le May writes that for three years in the Joint Chiefs of Staff he had been arguing for an attack on the North (p. 564). He was for an ultimatum warning Hanoi "to draw in their horns and stop their aggression, or we're going to bomb them back into the Stone Age. And we would shove them back into the Stone Age with Air power or Naval power—not with ground forces." (p. 565). This reference to the Stone Age is psychologically revealing, for Le May is a man of brutal

(Continued on Page Four)

## U.S. Gives Up Its Stockpile Weapon In Return for Aluminum Price Rollback

### How Peking Saved the U.S. From Defeat at the United Nations

China's bid for UN membership seems to have been defeated by China itself. Were it not for Peking's insistence on a hard line resolution, there would certainly have been a majority instead of a 47-47 tie. It is also possible that a more tactful resolution might have changed the four votes necessary to defeat the U.S. motion declaring China's membership an "important question" requiring a two-thirds majority. It passed 56 to 49. Cambodia led a bloc of China supporters who wanted a simple resolution seating Peking but not specifically calling for the ouster of Formosa. Actually, since there is only one China seat in the UN, the effect would be to oust Formosa. The super-Leftist Albanians won Peking support at the last moment for the version demanding Formosa's expulsion. In the voting, for the first time, the U.S. failed to carry the Latin American bloc. Chile defied Uncle Sam and abstained on the membership resolution instead of voting "No."

#### Why Africans Are Bitter Over Rhodesia

When Cuba contracted to buy one-third of its oil needs from Russia, the world oil cartel imposed an embargo overnight. No country except the Soviet Union could supply a drop. Cuba is an island. Rhodesia is landlocked and therefore much more easily shut off but the oil companies are doing their best to discourage an embargo and the new UN resolution is vague on the subject. It seems from Cuba's experience that defying the oil trust is a crime but racism is a minor misdemeanor—at least as long as it's white racism. When black racism raised its head in the Congo, real, exaggerated or alleged, the CIA provided U.S. planes and anti-Castro Cuban mercenary pilots to hunt down the rebels, missionaries were flown out and order restored. . . .

The U.S. rolled back aluminum prices but to appease the companies is agreeing to dispose of its remaining stockpile at market prices through the Big Three: Alcoa, Reynolds and Kaiser. This means it gives up its leverage in a future price rise. It will no longer be able to threaten to put aluminum on the open market. This is what the big producers have been bargaining for. . . . The effort to make Chile rescind its 2-cent increase in the price of copper is bound to stir ill feeling there.

#### Our Half-Hearted Policy on Rhodesia

"If our government was determined to apply economic pressures to the extent we are able, we would have stopped trade in minerals and equipment, the major items exchanged between the U.S. and Rhodesia. American imports from Rhodesia totalled about \$11 million last year; more than half, chrome and asbestos. About 38% of our chrome comes from Rhodesia but we have an adequate supply stockpiled. Exports to Rhodesia, on which the government has apparently placed no embargo, amounted to \$24 million, about half agricultural and road machinery."

—George M. Houser, of the American Committee on Africa, Nov. 19 calling on the U.S. to bar all trade with Rhodesia, to institute economic measures against Portugal and South Africa equivalent to any aid they give Rhodesia, to withdraw recognition from both countries if they recognize the rebels and to warn that force will be used if economic measures fail.

The Chilean government has a strike on its hands because it is trying to enforce its own guidelines on miners' wages. In a stringent world market, Chile wants a higher price to help finance its plans to become a refiner and fabricator of the metal instead of merely a producer of the ore. . . . We applaud Robert Kennedy's action in turning down Castelo Branco's invitation to address the cowed and purged Brazilian Congress and for pointedly telling a Sao Paulo audience on arrival in that country, "I believe in free institutions, free elections, freedom of protest." That's subversive in Brazil today. . . .

Iranians studying abroad have been working desperately to save the lives of two students sentenced to die for supposed complicity in a plot to kill the Shah after a trial foreign observers thought a travesty. For 13 years Iran has been living under a "state of emergency" in which (as one exile described it) "a man can suddenly disappear, to be heard of some ten years afterward, just because he has made a mildly critical comment on the prevalent corruption, poverty and illiteracy." Readers can perform a good deed for Christmas by writing a letter of protest to the Iranian Embassy, 3005 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, asking commutation of sentence.

### Vietcong Envisage Free Elections in South Vietnam After U.S. Withdrawal

"... a Vietcong agent stressed American recognition of the National Liberation Front as a prerequisite to any discussions. Following that gesture, he said, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam could be negotiated. Only after U.S. troops had left the country, he went on, could elections be held to determine the composition of a coalition government for South Vietnam. The Vietcong official stated that the Liberation Front, itself composed of various factions, could collaborate with non-Communist Saigon politicians. But he declined to specify which Cabinet posts the Front would claim in such a coalition.

"Other sources indicated, however, that the Vietcong has until now hesitated to label itself a government lest it discourage possible deals with Saigon politicians in the future. Vietcong leaders reportedly believe that another coup d'etat in the capital may uncover elements sympathetic to their cause.

"We realize that the prestige of the U.S. is at stake, and thus we must have an acceptable solution," the Viet-

cong official continued. 'But the U.S. must also realize that the people in our liberated zones will not tolerate the presence of American troops before a solution is reached. We cannot accept a cease-fire, as Senator Mansfield has suggested, because we could not defend ourselves. If peace is established without a guarantee, it is valueless and we may as well continue the struggle. What is the guarantee? The withdrawal of foreign troops.'

"What about North Vietnamese troops in the South? The answer was oblique and evasive: 'We cannot have foreign interference in our country, not even by Hanoi, which we consider a foreign government. It is true that all Vietnamese recognize only one President, Ho Chi Minh. But to be politically realistic, we must solve South Vietnam's problem in the South itself. Reunification is for the future—perhaps in 15 or 20 years.'"

—Stanley Karnow from Hong Kong (Washington Post, Nov. 19) reporting conversations in European and African capitals with North Vietnamese and Vietcong spokesmen.

## Humphrey's Moonlight Ride With Negro Leaders Proved Politically Unromantic

### More Explosion Than Planning in White House Meeting on Civil Rights

Vice-President Humphrey invited Martin Luther King, Clarence Mitchell and several other Negro leaders for a moonlight ride along the Potomac September 21. The men were to discuss plans for the mid-November White House Conference to "Fulfill These Rights" which LBJ had promised in his June 4 Howard University speech. A few days later, the White House announced the conference had been postponed until spring, 1966. Humphrey, having sampled the views of the civil rights leaders on the way Washington was handling the new laws, decided that an open conference would risk a public relations disaster.

#### Padding the Guest List

A "planning session" was quickly organized for Nov. 17-18. The guest list was delicately balanced. Militants like John Lewis of SNCC and Floyd McKissick of CORE were paired with scholars like Adolph Berle and Leon Keyserling. Panelists arriving at the Washington Hilton were advised by conference officials that their task was not to seek conclusions or make recommendations. The function of the sessions, they were told, was solely to plan an agenda for the spring meeting. To ensure a "free exchange of ideas" the press was barred from the working rooms. Information was limited to briefings and plenary sessions. Panelists were even requested not to discuss the meetings with reporters at the numerous receptions and luncheons.

Opening day, the administration's precautions appeared to be at least superficially successful. Panelists joked about the government sponsored "old home week for the movement." Reporters in search of news seized on LBJ's proposal for a study of de facto school segregation and an off-hand reference by A. Philip Randolph to a \$100 billion "Freedom Budget." But beneath the convention atmosphere, an undercurrent of tension was evident. Several of the "background" papers commented on Washington's reluctance to use its full authority and a CORE statement plainly derided the administration's "breakthroughs" of the summer and fall of 1965. It said the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, created July 2, had as yet to file a single order against a company or union. The report complained that federal registrars had been sent to only 32 of the more than 400 counties eligible. And, noted that despite the Office of Education's "guidelines" for integration, 92.5% of Southern Negro children were still in segregated schools.

By the second morning, what the administration had hoped to avoid was plainly beginning to happen. Panelists in every area comparing notes with colleagues had found the federal situation to be worse than they had imagined. Proposals for family planning were played down in favor of declarations

#### New Theories to Hide Old Failures

"It is now fashionable in some circles to proclaim that the major problems of giving to the Negro equality in American society have been solved and now we must deal only with the individual deficiencies of Negroes to make them 'ready.' To mask the fact that the economy has failed to generate a sufficient number of new jobs we attribute the Negro unemployment rate of 8.3% to the Negro's failure to train himself. To excuse the failures of the public school system we ascribe the Negro's lack of success in school to the 'fact' that he is 'culturally deprived'. To cover the inadequate supply of decent low-cost housing we invent the attribute of the 'untenable' nature of Negro families. And most recently, in a new and all embracing canard, we hear about the 'pathology' of the Negro family instead of the sickness of American society. We reject each of these explanations as false and misleading, resulting in (if not actually designed for) the avoidance of the real problems. The Negro in America continues to face the double jeopardy of caste and class. The problems which face us . . . are deep-seated and structural in nature. They demand bold and imaginative rethinking and reshaping of many of the institutions of our society.

—CORE statement, White House conference, Nov. 17

of dissatisfaction with Washington's "voluntary compliance" policies. Word leaked from the education panel that the group was demanding an immediate cut-off of funds to school districts with discriminatory programs. From the voting panel came word of a demand for 500-600 additional registrars.

The strongest appeal for action came from the panel on the administration of justice. With the outspoken report on Southern law enforcement prepared by the Civil Rights Commission as its basis, the group drafted a resolution urging Johnson to give his full support to a federal statute "to protect the security of all Americans and to replace segregated justice." The resolution also urged the President to enforce existing laws which protect the safety of Negro and white civil rights workers and to station federal officials with the power to make on the spot arrests at the scenes of possible violence.

The significance of the conference was not in the sociological formulae which emerged. Washington did not have to be told that fulfillment of Negro rights will require increased federal spending and improved job opportunities. The significance of the conference was the confrontation it produced. For the first time the leaders of the Negro "establishment" sat across the table from the top echelons of the federal government. What they told them, in effect, was that elaborate meetings and pious promises will not earn the administration the activist label it is so anxious to get.

—P. O.

### The Big, Bold, Brave FBI Afraid It Might Get Hurt If It Defended Negroes?

"The Administration is not expected to yield to growing pressures for a substantial increase in the use of Federal police powers in racially tense areas [as recommended by the Civil Rights Commission and the administration of justice panel at the White House Civil Rights Conference] . . . Civil rights workers have long complained FBI agents stand by and take notes while a demonstrator is being

beaten . . . Any effort to employ FBI agents in a peace-keeping role would encounter the formidable opposition of J. Edgar Hoover . . . Justice Department officials fear a situation where great numbers of whites and local law enforcement officers might turn on Federal agents if they stepped in and arrested persons harassing or harming demonstrators."

—New York Times, Nov. 22

## The Disillusioning History of "Operation Strangle"

(Continued from Page One)

Stone Age mentality. Strategic bombing did indeed level North Korea's factories and destroy its cities. But it neither shortened the war nor brought victory.

### We Won't Shorten The War By Widening It

Strategic bombing began on Aug. 10, 1950, a month after the war's outbreak and was completed on Sept. 26. "In little more than a month," says the official Air Force History of its role in the Korean war,\* "the FEAF (Far East Air Forces) Bomber command had neutralized all but one strategic bombing objective contributing support to the North Korean People's Army," and that was some naval oil storage tanks at Rashin, too close to the Russian border to be bombed without risk. But though we thus pushed North Korea "back to the Stone Age," the war went on for three more years and we were pushed out of North Korea and back behind the 38th parallel. It was the first war in our history we did not win, despite our crushing aerial superiority and savagery. Yet Le May is still peddling the same terrible nostrums.

In North Vietnam we began with interdiction bombing and are being urged to go on to strategic bombing. In the Korean war, after we exhausted the targets for strategic bombing, we went on to interdiction, i.e. the bombing of supply lines, rail and road. It is instructive to go back and look at the official U.S. Air Force history and read the exaggerated publicity with which the Air Force launched its flamboyantly named "Operation Strangle" and "Operation Saturate" against enemy supply. It turned out later that "only 7% of bombs dropped by Thunderjets were cutting the enemy's railway tracks" (p. 412). One B-26 made five separate attacks with 500-pound bombs at night "on a well lighted South Korean motor pool" and claimed to have destroyed six trucks but it later turned out that the raid had only punctured the tires on two jeeps (footnote, p. 423). We soon found, in the words of one Air Force officer, that "we were trading B-26s for trucks in a most uneconomical manner" (p. 425). In July, 1951, the month the war began, the Communists fired only about 8,000 rounds

\* The U.S. Air Force in Korea, by Futrell, Moseley and Simpson (Duell, Sloan and Pierce, 1961), p. 184.

### The Truth Catches Up Dept.

The bombings of North Vietnam are supposed to have improved morale among the South Vietnamese forces, and cut the rate of desertions. Now an AP dispatch from Saigon (Washington Star, Nov. 22) reports that the number of these deserters has been steadily rising. It says there were 87,000 in the first ten months of this year as against 72,000 in 1964. "The desertion rate is highest in the Popular Forces," the AP said, "particularly in contested areas . . . When the Viet Cong move into a village, mass desertions for long periods are not uncommon."

Only a few weeks ago the Defense Department denied a Washington Post story (Nov. 4) that war-plane losses over North Vietnam were running slightly under 7 per 1,000 sorties or twice the loss rate in the Korean war. It said the rate was only 3.2 per 1,000. Now Hanson Baldwin (New York Times from Saigon Nov. 22) says the Air Force has flown about 9,320 sorties over North Vietnam and the Navy aircraft "about the same number." He said total plane losses were 141. This figures out to 7.5 per 1,000 sorties. The Defense Department refuses to deny or confirm his figures.

of artillery and mortar but 10 months later, despite "Operation Strangle," they were able in May, 1952, to direct some 102,000 rounds against United Nations positions. By the end of the war they had even built up enough surplus stocks to launch an offensive (p. 435). Surveillance studies showed "the Reds fixed rail cuts in from two to six hours, made bridge repairs in from two to four days" and soon built up enough anti-aircraft guns "to take an unacceptable toll of FEAF planes in Korea." (p. 437).

The delusions that failed in Korea are not going to win in Vietnam. Indeed we would do far better to call off the raids on the North as a first step toward negotiation and stop the saturation bombing of the South as a first step to winning back some of its people. We salute the *New York Times* for advocating this course. The Nixon-Le May route can only lead by extension to what Herblock in a brilliant cartoon Nov. 23 called "Total Peace Through Total Victory Through Total World Blowup." Ike rejected Nixon's views in 1954. We hope Johnson won't accept them in 1966.

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